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 1 
“WE REALLY (FOR THE MOST PART)  
MEAN IT!” 
Richard D. Friedman*† 
I closed my petition for certiorari in Hammon v. Indiana by declaring, 
“
 
‘We really mean it!’ is the message that lower courts need to hear, and that 
decision of this case can send.” The prior year, Crawford v. Washington had 
transformed the law of the Confrontation Clause, holding that an out-of-
court statement that is testimonial in nature may be admitted against an ac-
cused only if the maker of the statement is unavailable and the accused has 
had an opportunity to cross-examine her. But Crawford deliberately left un-
determined what the term “testimonial” meant. Many lower courts gave it a 
grudging interpretation, devising a range of doctrines that allowed them to 
continue much as they had before, admitting out-of-court statements that 
they deemed sufficiently reliable even though the accused never had an op-
portunity to cross-examine the maker of the statement. 
Hammon was a good example of this phenomenon. Hershel Hammon 
was convicted of battery on the basis of an accusation made by his wife, 
Amy. But she never testified at trial (not because she was scared to, but ap-
parently because she did not want him convicted). Instead, the critical 
evidence at trial consisted of the testimony of a police officer, recounting the 
oral accusation that Amy made to him in the family living room the night of 
the incident, and an affidavit, similarly narrating the incident, which Amy 
completed at the officer’s request immediately after she made her oral accu-
sation. The case was tried ten months before Crawford, and though defense 
counsel objected because of his inability to cross-examine Amy—“Makes 
me mad,” he said—the trial judge thought both statements were easily ad-
missible. “You might want to refresh your memory regarding the hearsay 
rules,” he told counsel, admitting the oral statement as an excited utterance 
and the affidavit as a present sense impression. That, in pre-Crawford days, 
sufficed to dispose of concerns under the Confrontation Clause as well as 
under the hearsay rule. Hammon was convicted, but by the time the appel-
late courts decided his case Crawford had come down, and the Indiana 
Supreme Court had to acknowledge that the affidavit was testimonial. After 
all, it was under oath, quite formal, with an invocation of the domestic bat-
tery statute, and clearly prepared in contemplation of criminal proceedings. 
The court held, though, that the oral statement was not testimonial, because 
when the officer took that statement he was not preparing a case; rather, he 
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was “securing and assessing the scene.” The conviction stood, the court 
drawing the highly dubious conclusion that admission of the affidavit in a 
bench trial was harmless error. 
The state supreme court’s decision in Hammon struck me immediately 
as a perfect vehicle for the United States Supreme Court to refine the mean-
ing of “testimonial.” If the Court was serious in Crawford about 
reinvigorating the Confrontation Clause, then Amy’s oral accusation, as well 
as the affidavit, must be regarded as testimonial. Otherwise, the Court would 
be tolerating a system in which an accuser could create evidence for prose-
cution—in other words, testify—simply by speaking to an officer in her 
living room, without any need to come to court, take an oath, face the ac-
cused, or submit to cross-examination. 
Hammon and Kimberly Jackson, his appellate counsel, consented to my 
filing a petition for certiorari. Meanwhile, Davis v. Washington was slightly 
further along the pipeline. Davis also involved an accusation of domestic 
violence by a complainant who did not appear at trial. But in contrast to the 
relatively calm setting in which Amy Hammon made her accusation—an 
undetermined time after the alleged incident—the accusation in Davis was 
made immediately afterwards, during a 911 call, while the accuser, Michelle 
McCottry, was still in obvious distress. Ms. Hammon was in the company of 
one officer while another kept her husband away when she made her accusa-
tion. But no one was protecting Ms. McCottry when she made her 
accusation: the accused was still at large, and the call began just as he was 
leaving the scene. From the defense point of view, Davis was a much 
tougher case. 
That is not to say that I thought Davis should lose. Ms. McCottry made 
an accusation of crime to a government agent who was a direct conduit to 
the police, and she did so in circumstances that would lead any reasonable 
person to understand that she was invoking the power of the state against the 
accused, since much of the conversation concerned a restraining order that 
already bound Davis. Apart from enforcement of that order, Ms. McCottry 
was not asking for protection, and none was offered. If she or the 911 opera-
tor had been afraid that Davis would return imminently to the house, then 
the obvious response would have been to send police there. But instead the 
operator told her that the police would first find Davis and then come to talk 
to her. In short, a reasonable person would understand that Ms. McCottry 
was providing information that would be used immediately to enforce the 
restraining order and might well be used later for criminal prosecution. I 
believe that she should have been deemed to be acting as a witness. 
Even so, Davis was so much harder a case that I had grave qualms when 
the Court granted certiorari in both cases, because the inclination of the 
Court might be to split the baby—to hold for Hammon and against Davis. 
As Hammon’s lawyer, I had to regard that as good news. But as a scholar 
long active in this field, I was afraid that the Court would render the cate-
gory of testimonial statements far more restrictive than it ought to be. I was 
especially afraid that this would happen because a result in favor of Davis 
would represent a dramatic departure from the state of the law that had pre-
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vailed before Crawford. The analogy that came to mind was of the bends, 
the malady that afflicts deep sea divers if they try to ascend too quickly 
rather than get accustomed to intermediate stages a little at a time. In Craw-
ford, the statement in question had been taped and made under considerable 
formality in the police station several hours after the incident, when the ac-
cused was already in police custody. Hammon, involving a less formal 
statement made at the scene—an undetermined but presumably short time 
after the incident, while the accused was guarded by police but before he 
was taken into custody—represented a small but intuitively appealing de-
velopment from Crawford. A reversal in Davis, however, would make a 
large change in a hurry. It would mean that, within a little more than two 
years, the Court had moved from the pre-Crawford level to the conclusion 
that an urgent and distressed statement made immediately after the event 
was testimonial. 
After the oral argument I managed to persuade myself that Davis as well 
as Hammon had a good chance of winning; whether this was the natural and 
perhaps salutary tendency of litigators to be somewhat optimistic, or merely 
self-delusion, I will not speculate. In the end, the Court did split the baby, 
drawing a sharp distinction between the two cases. Unanimously, it held that 
the statement in Davis was not testimonial. But with only Justice Thomas 
dissenting, it held the opposite in Hammon. 
The facts of the two cases are sufficiently different that it is easy to draw 
a line between them. Whether the line that the Court did draw is a sound or 
sturdy one is another question. The Court said:  
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interro-
gation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing 
emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indi-
cate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant 
to later criminal prosecution. 
Many questions now arise: 
 
• How does one determine what the primary purpose of interrogation 
is, given that, as Justice Thomas points out, very often the police have two 
clear objectives, to resolve the immediate situation before them and to 
gather evidence for prosecution? Will police now have an incentive to leave 
the emergency unresolved until they can gather evidence? 
 
• Why does the purpose of the interrogation matter, given that, as the 
Court acknowledges, “it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, 
not the interrogator’s questions,” that are decisive under the Confrontation 
Clause? Could it be that the interrogator’s purpose is significant because of 
the light it sheds on the declarant’s understanding of the situation? 
 
4 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 105:1 
 
• What qualifies as an “emergency,” when is it no longer “ongoing,” 
and why did the setting of Davis qualify as an “ongoing emergency,” given 
that by the time of the 911 call the alleged assailant was leaving the scene 
and that the complainant did not ask for immediate protection and the 911 
operator did not offer it? (Within the space of two sentences, the Court sug-
gests that the emergency ended “after the operator gained the information 
needed to address the exigency of the moment,” “when Davis drove away,” 
and when “[t]he operator . . . told McCottry to be quiet, and proceeded to 
pose a battery of questions”— these events, however, did not necessarily 
occur at the same time.) 
 
*** 
 
The Court also leaves rather uncertain the question of what degree of 
formality, if any, is necessary for a statement to be characterized as testimo-
nial. In response to Justice Thomas’s opinion, the majority goes so far as to 
say, “We do not dispute that formality is indeed essential to testimonial ut-
terance.” Failure to dispute a proposition is, of course, not necessarily an 
adoption of it. In distinguishing Davis from Crawford, the Court mentions 
among other considerations the “striking” difference in the level of formal-
ity between the two interrogations—but the Court does not suggest that an 
informal interrogation cannot be conducted, by both parties to it, primarily 
for the purpose of transmitting evidence for use in prosecution. Indeed, 
elsewhere in the opinion Justice Scalia makes clear that the Confrontation 
Clause is not limited to “prior court testimony and formal depositions”; it is 
not conceivable, he writes, that the protections of the Clause could “readily 
be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay 
testimony of the declarant.” This passage confirms what was plain at argu-
ment, that Justice Scalia got the point: The Clause requires that testimony be 
given under prescribed conditions, and it would be rendered virtually worth-
less if it could be avoided simply by making an informal accusation to the 
authorities. It appears that the Court’s rather muddled language with respect to 
formality resulted from its partially successful efforts to achieve consensus. 
In any event, the Court makes clear that if it continues to speak in terms 
of formality, the standard will be a very loose one. Responding to Justice 
Thomas, the Court states flatly, “Restricting the Confrontation Clause to the 
precise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its ex-
tinction.” The Court is also explicit that none of the most salient features of 
the Crawford interrogation—that it “followed a Miranda warning, was tape-
recorded, and took place at the station house”—were essential to character-
izing Sylvia Crawford’s statement as testimonial. It was formal enough, the 
Court says, that Amy Hammon’s accusation was made in a room separate 
from her husband, with the officer recording her answers for his investiga-
tion. It seems likely, moreover, that note-taking by the officer is merely of 
evidentiary significance, and likewise was not crucial to characterizing the 
statement as testimonial. Elsewhere, the Court adds that sufficient formality 
is imported by the fact that lies to police officers are criminal offenses; this, 
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too, is presumably not a necessary condition. In the end, it may be that a 
formality test will add nothing to the general standard of whether the state-
ment was made “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.” That would be good news. 
There is more good news as well. The Court is explicit that it found 
Hammon a “much easier” case than Davis. It makes clear that if the state-
ment concerns a closed event—“what happened” rather than “what is 
happening”—then it should usually be considered testimonial. The pattern 
of the Court’s decisions after Davis on pending certiorari petitions suggests 
that the Court indeed recognizes that most accusatory statements made to 
police officers in the field should be considered testimonial. And further 
confirmation is provided by the Court’s apparent endorsement of the pre-
Framing English case R. v. Brasier, which characterized as testimonial an 
accusation of attempted rape made by a young child to her mother immedi-
ately after coming home; neither the immediacy of the statement, the youth 
of the declarant, nor the private status of the audience removes the statement 
from the protections of the confrontation right, and that is as it should be. 
The Court also manages to close one can of worms, going well out of its 
way to make clear (though some lower courts have not recognized this so 
far) that if a statement is not testimonial it is not covered by the Confronta-
tion Clause. Good! This is the right result as a matter of principle; it may 
lend some clarity and focus to the law, and the prior regime of testing state-
ments for reliability never provided any real protection with respect to non-
testimonial hearsay anyway. 
What’s next? The Court has only hinted at, and not adopted a general 
standard of, what is testimonial. There is so much open space between 
Davis and Hammon that the Court may have to wade once again into the 
area of fresh accusations. The strong hint given by the citation of Brasier 
will probably not remove all doubt with respect to the applicability of Craw-
ford to statements by children and to private recipients. In a variety of 
settings—reports of autopsies, of laboratory tests, of deportations, etc.—
statements by government agents pose significant questions. 
Finally, the doctrine of forfeiture must be clarified. The Court rightly in-
dicates that if the accused’s inability to cross-examine the witness is caused 
by the accused’s own wrongdoing, he forfeits the confrontation right. The 
doctrine should be applied robustly—the court should be able to find forfei-
ture on the basis of the same wrongdoing that underlies the jury’s finding of 
guilt on the merits. But when the prosecution contends that the accused 
committed forfeiture by intimidation, it ought to be required to do more than 
present a police officer’s testimony that the witness is scared to testify. 
What, if any, procedures the Supreme Court requires prosecutors and trial 
judges to pursue as a predicate for a conclusion of forfeiture may be one of 
the most critical tests of just how much the Court really meant what it said 
in Crawford. 
